For the extended analysis, see https://threads.chez.work/en/findings/probusinessbank-khishchenie-a-ne-risk-shifting/. Below is a compact recap.

Key points:

  • “Risk shifting” would imply market exposure borne by shareholders with obligations to repay. Here, the structure removed bank assets at inception via non‑recourse‑in‑practice documentation.
  • Loans were issued to offshores with no operations, collateral, or guarantees (Ambika, Merrianol, Vermenda), so repayment was effectively optional.
  • Broker “bridges” with Events of Default and margin mechanics meant the economic loss crystallized on the bank unless owners voluntarily replenished assets.
  • The Wonderworks example: USD 360m loaned to owner‑controlled vehicles; USD 190m profit reported; principal never returned to the bank.
  • Post‑intervention write‑downs of “high‑quality assets” (~USD 470m) exceeding capital immediately demonstrate that these were not genuine assets but engineered “holes.”

If you only keep one intuition:

When a bank’s “assets” predictably disappear to third parties unless insiders voluntarily repay, that’s not risk management gone wrong; it’s theft built into paperwork.