This continuation focuses on specific documents and why they’re important for understanding what happened at Probusinessbank.

What to look at first:

  1. Broker agreements and confirmations under the three core bridges (DMBL → Vermenda, OCIL → Ambika, BCS Cyprus → Merrianol). These show how bank assets left the balance sheet and why “repayment” was structurally optional for the receiving offshores.
  2. Internal reporting and correspondence around Events of Default and margin/collateral calls under those broker structures. You’ll see that the “risk” crystallized mechanically and predictably against the bank.
  3. Central Bank supervisory correspondence in 2015 (pre‑revocation), especially about the detection of non‑market “deposits”/positions and instructions to provision or unwind.
  4. Provisional administration and bankruptcy documentation quantifying the hole (e.g., the write‑down of ~USD 470m “high‑quality assets” post‑intervention).
  5. Ownership/control documentation linking Ambika, Merrianol, Vermenda, Wonderworks, Larienta, Lankora, etc., to the bank’s shareholders and their close circle.

A minimal reading path for newcomers:

  • Start with the compact media overview by The Bell.
  • Then open the primary documentation on Katz’s site: https://the-treasurer.com
  • Finally, read about the additional schemes not included there:
    • Mediobanca → Larienta: https://threads.chez.work/en/findings/tokmakov-and-larienta/
    • Falcon Private Bank → Lankora: https://threads.chez.work/en/findings/lankora-and-falcon/

Two recurring technical patterns to keep in mind:

  • “Clean face onboarding + undisclosed assignment”: a reputable borrower first, followed by reassignment to a shell that cannot be onboarded directly (see the DMBL/Vermenda analogy).
  • Non‑recourse economics in practice: contract structures where the bank’s “asset” predictably disappears to a broker/third party absent voluntary repayment by the offshore.

If you only retain one test from this note:

Whenever you see that the bank’s capital is dwarfed by the post‑intervention write‑down of allegedly “high‑quality assets,” you’re not looking at “risk shifting,” you’re looking at theft engineered via documentation.