Zheleznyakgate is the name of the scandal around Probusinessbank, Sergey Leontiev, Alexander Zheleznyak, and Alexander Lomov. At its core: asset stripping from the bank and the subsequent attempt to frame the case as political persecution through an alleged connection to Navalny. I see no documented, proven connection to Navalny: this narrative was pushed by Ashurkov and Volkov, and later supported by people in FBK/ACF circles.

What Happened to the Money

Maxim Katz’s investigation Money Czar shows how Leontiev and Zheleznyak siphoned hundreds of millions of dollars out of Probusinessbank through offshore companies and brokerage schemes. Through Vermenda, Ambika, and Merrianol, the bank pledged its assets as collateral for loans to affiliated companies, failed to disclose these guarantees to the regulator, and after loan defaults the assets went to the brokers.

A separate case — Immoger. The German company Prim Holding was set up under Zheleznyak and owned Immoger Group GmbH. On March 24, 2015, Immoger received a €4 million loan from Probusinessbank. The money immediately went to Prim Holding, and a week later the bank terminated the surety agreements. These documents were signed by Zheleznyak himself as chairman of the bank’s board of directors. After that, the loan to Zheleznyak’s company became unsecured and was never repaid.

Lomov is no less important. According to the criminal case materials, it was he who sent falsified reports to the Central Bank, concealing the growing hole in the bank. Later, Lomov appeared in the ACF infrastructure: in December 2021, he was listed as president, vice president, and treasurer of the foundation — before Navalny publicly announced the «international FBK.»

The financial side is examined in more detail in the primer, the rebuttal to objections, and the piece on schemes. It is also worth noting that FBK, in its response, did not address Immoger: the loan to Zheleznyak’s company, the transfer of money to Prim Holding, the cancellation of guarantees by Zheleznyak himself, and the lack of repayment.

How the Political Defense Emerged

After the bank’s collapse in 2015, Leontiev and Zheleznyak fled Russia. The first line of defense — both in courts and in attempts to get media coverage — was built around KVORUM: Vladislav Solodkiy argued that the DIA (Deposit Insurance Agency), through the company Quorum Debt Management (Andrei Pavlov, Artem Zuev), which was linked to the «Magnitsky case,» orchestrated a corporate raid on Probusinessbank’s assets. This position failed both in courts and in the media.

The turning point came with Ashurkov’s affidavit:

  1. July 26, 2017 — Vladimir Ashurkov, executive director of FBK, filed an affidavit in the United States. He claimed that Probusinessbank’s management had participated in the «Navalny Card» project and that their prosecution was political revenge by the Kremlin. The affidavit was used by Leontiev’s defense in a Liechtenstein court to unfreeze assets.
  2. 2019–2021 — Ashurkov’s testimony was used in courts in Poland and Switzerland.
  3. February–April 2022 — Liechtenstein courts found the arguments about political motivation «credible,» terminated the criminal money laundering investigation (case No. 13 UR.2017.167), denied legal assistance to the Russian Investigative Committee, and unfroze Leontiev’s assets totaling over $105 million.
  4. December 2022 — as part of a series of articles initiated by Leontiev in Western media, the Financial Times published a piece in which Leonid Volkov gave comments defending Leontiev and Zheleznyak as «persecuted opposition figures.»
  5. 2023–2024 — Volkov, Ashurkov, and Maria Pevchikh continued to publicly defend this narrative, including through The Insider’s investigation about Operation «Ice Axe.»

In the article on Ashurkov’s affidavit, I examine how the «Navalny Card» was turned into a link between the bankers and Navalny, even though the documents show the project was the initiative of marketer Vyacheslav Solodkiy. The main recent piece is the Ashurkov breakdown: it compiles his latest explanations, the ACF infrastructure, Stripe, and the judicial role of his testimony.

The key takeaway: people in FBK/ACF circles did not merely provide reputational cover for the bankers. They gave Leontiev, Zheleznyak, and Lomov a political shield that helped steer the case away from the question of returning what was stolen. In the importance of the affidavit, I separately analyze how Ashurkov’s testimony was enough for a court to avoid examining the case on its merits, and in my interview breakdown — how this facade helped unfreeze the money and subsequently block proceedings about the theft.

How to Read Further

  • Ashurkov Interview Breakdown — start here: the latest explanations, Stripe, ACF, and sworn testimony.
  • Money Czar — a concise external database from Katz’s investigation.
  • Chronology — the public history of Zheleznyak, Leontiev, Lomov, and the FBK connection.
  • Primer — why this is not just an ordinary bank failure.
  • Rebuttal — why FBK’s objections do not dismiss the financial side.
  • Schemes — DMBL, OCIL, BCS Cyprus, Vermenda, Ambika, Merrianol, Immoger.
  • Affidavit — how the «Navalny Card» entered the judicial frame.
  • Importance — how political cover blocked the recovery of stolen assets.