«Hottentot» Selectivity
In any healthy political environment, the «reputation institute» is a mechanism of accountability. It is based on a simple principle: your words and actions have consequences that determine the level of public trust in you. It is a system of checks and balances that, like an immune system, rejects unethical, dishonest, and incompetent actors, preventing them from lingering in the public sphere. But in the Russian opposition, this mechanism has mutated into its opposite: it has become not an immune system, but an autoimmune disease that devours healthy cells while protecting cancerous tumors.
In its place has grown a punitive tool whose main function is not to establish the truth, but to preserve the monopoly on power, resources, and narrative by one group I will politely call «the clique.» This machine works by systematically suppressing and destroying any competitors. This is not just squabbling. This is a well-oiled business model for maintaining a monopoly on resources: attention, legitimacy, and money. And the «reputation institute» is its main enforcement tool. To understand how it works, we need to uncover its fundamental principle — absolute selectivity.
The golden rule is: principles exist only for «outsiders.» For «insiders,» there is a presumption of innocence, mutual cover-ups, and the right to deafening silence. The clearest example of this is the mirror comparison of two cases: the attack on the business of Maxim Katz’s wife, Ekaterina Patyulina, and the covering up of the legal and commercial infrastructure of the «clique» itself.
Attacking «Outsiders»
The FBK’s «investigation» into Ekaterina Patyulina’s advertising agency is an example of manufacturing kompromat out of thin air, based on manipulation, substitution of concepts, and outright lies. It was not investigative or journalistic work, but an operation to create vulnerability and inflict maximum reputational damage on a political competitor who had offended the FBK, through his family.
The first and main manipulation was the accusation of personal enrichment. Zhdanov repeatedly repeated the claim of 90 million rubles allegedly received by Patyulina for personal use. The infographic and confident tone were apparently meant to create in the viewer’s mind the image of a corruption scheme comparable to those in which the foundation accuses Russian officials. In reality, this was a crude lie. Anyone familiar with the advertising business understands that 90 million is the agency’s turnover, not net profit. This is the budget the client allocates for a campaign, from which the agency pays bloggers and contractors, keeping a commission. Thus, the real profit over several years of work was about 9–12 million rubles — a perfectly standard figure for a legal small business, clearly not a sign of fabulous enrichment. But the goal was achieved: the uninitiated viewer was left with the figure «90 million» in their head.
The second tool was the so-called «time machine.» The FBK accused Patyulina’s agency of working for state propaganda, in particular, supporting «SVOi» videos on the VKontakte platform. However, this accusation was based on absurd logic. The claims were made for content that appeared on the platform more than six months after the agency’s advertising contract with VK had ended. This is like accusing a construction company that built a house in 2010 of crimes committed by a new resident of that house in 2020. The purpose of this manipulation was to create a direct, albeit false, link between Katz’s family and support for the SVO.
The third element of the attack was the accusation of «poaching» bloggers to a pro-government platform. Again, the accusation does not hold up to reality. None of the major bloggers who worked with Patyulina’s agency moved exclusively to VK. They fulfilled the terms of the advertising contract, received money from VK (thus taking it out of the pocket of a pro-government structure that could have spent it on something worse), and continued to work on their main platforms — YouTube and others. VKontakte’s strategy to lure the audience failed. But for the FBK, this did not matter. What mattered was creating the image of betraying the interests of the free internet audience. Incidentally, the FBK never closed a single group in the dreaded «VKontakte» — there are still calls to join the underground headquarters of an extremist organization.
But the most important thing in this story is not so much the accusations themselves as their origin. The FBK’s libel came out after Maxim Katz released a film about the foundation’s ties to bankers Alexander Zheleznyak and Sergey Leontiev, and at the same time as they were staging a paper circus in a Liechtenstein court. And, as later became known from Katz’s public statements, six months earlier Patyulina had been threatened that if he continued to dig, they would «hit the business.» Thus, the FBK’s investigation looks like the execution of a direct threat from a subject of the investigation. The «clique» acted as a tool for settling scores, turning their attack from political criticism into an act with signs of a criminal showdown.
Protecting «Insiders»
At the very same time that the «clique» was righteously carrying out Zheleznyak’s threats, a whole ecosystem was emerging in their own circle, built on opaque connections and blatant conflicts of interest.
At the center of this ecosystem is a VPN sales project implemented by Mikhail Klimarev and Leonid Volkov under the banner of their «Internet Protection Society.» This VPN is sold mainly by FBK-loyal media and bloggers (including Michael Naki, one of the first clients of the business model) who, without disclosing the conflict of interest, present the product as «their own» and receive income from its distribution from Volkov. For example, Naki claimed in his post: «It’s literally mine. So I’ll be the one responsible for it.» Later, under pressure from facts, Volkov was forced to admit in comments that this was not the case: «The product is nVPN. The platform is VPNGenerator.»
Legal support for this «product» of Michael Naki is provided by lawyer Dmitry Dubograev. He previously also serviced the lobbying (now closed) NGO «Anti-Corruption Foundation USA.»
The choice of this particular lawyer, in the context of recent history, says a lot. Dubograev was very well acquainted with Sergey Leontiev and partially integrated into his business. He not only represented his interests in court: trademarks of Leontiev’s paintball club were registered to Dubograev, and Dubograev’s son directly participates in «Life Factoring,» created for Leontiev in the USA. Leontiev’s interests were also represented by the firm «Kobre & Kim,» which lobbies for lifting sanctions on Roman Abramovich.
Leontiev is a close friend and constant business partner of Alexander Zheleznyak, whose revenge fueled the media attempt to destroy Patyulina’s business, publicly denounce a list of employees allegedly working for the foreign agent Katz, and discredit him.
All media tools were deployed in defense of Leontiev and Zheleznyak. For example, Volkov’s associate Sergey Boyko (also part of the OZI) told a false story on the «Popular Politics» channel that Alexander Zheleznyak was supposedly the only one who «opened a card for Navalny.» This was apparently a clumsy reference to the failed «Navalny Card» project, which was never implemented for commercial and technical — not political — reasons, but which Leontiev and Zheleznyak actively use in Western courts as proof of their «opposition» status. The main legal «proof» of this was an affidavit by Vladimir Ashurkov from 2017, where the whole story was turned inside out to create the desired image. Or Guriev, who accused anyone interested in Zheleznyak of working for the SVR. And the article about «Ledorub» in «The Insider»…
I digress. Dmitry Dubograev is a representative of the American company Oxygen Forensics. This company is the developer and supplier of the «Mobile Forensics» software, which, according to government procurement data and numerous investigations, is one of the key tools in the arsenal of the FSB and the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation. This software is used to crack the phones of opposition members, activists, and journalists — the very audience to whom the «clique» sells its VPN supposedly to protect them from that same FSB.
Even with the Belarusian opposition, he is connected, but unfortunately, not in the best way.
Against the backdrop of this multi-layered system of mutual cover-ups, where commercial interests intertwine with the protection of dubious bankers and legal ties to suppliers of spy software for the FSB, the attack on the legal advertising business of an opponent’s wife — and after direct threats from a shady banker — looks like the height of cynicism.
«A Plague on Both Your Houses!»
When an ordinary person sympathetic to the opposition watches this parade of hypocrisy, they are in no hurry to dig into the details. They don’t dive into American corporate registries or read multi-page party charters. They see something else: dirt, shouting, mutual accusations, and endless conflict. And their natural reaction is disgust.
This is where the phenomenon of “a plague on both your houses” arises. A bystander, tired of the toxicity, spreads the negativity equally over all participants in the conflict, regardless of their actual contribution. They no longer care who started it first or who brought more substantial evidence. Everyone is equally bad.
This is not a sign of the observer’s stupidity. It is the result of several powerful psychological mechanisms.
First, cognitive ease. It is much simpler and less energy-consuming to conclude “they’re all the same” than to try to untangle a complex knot of facts, half-truths, and outright lies. The brain instinctively chooses the path of least resistance.
Second, aversion to conflict. Constant exposure to aggression and hostility causes emotional burnout and apathy. The easiest way to get rid of this discomfort is to devalue the very subject of the dispute and all its participants. This is psychological self-defense against negativity.
Third, false equivalence. When both sides use aggressive rhetoric, the bystander perceives their contribution to the conflict as equal, even if one side operates with facts and the other with manipulations. The form (an aggressive argument) becomes more important than the content (factual correctness).
This is the tragic paradox and, at the same time, the tactical success of the “clique.” Even losing on the facts, they win strategically. Their main goal is not to prove they are right, but to drag the opponent into the mud and keep them there long enough for the bystander to stop seeing the difference. They successfully discredit not only their enemy but the very idea of political discussion, turning it into a repulsive spectacle.
Controlling the Truth
When the system of double standards fails and inconvenient facts still break through, the pseudo-reputation institute moves to the second, more complex stage of defense. Its task is to retain control over the narrative at all costs — over what the audience will consider the truth. If you cannot win the argument on the merits, you must ensure that the argument either does not take place at all, or takes place on your terms, on your territory, and with a pre-appointed culprit. To do this, three key tools are used: controlled dissemination of information, critical discrediting of inconvenient truth, and aggressive suppression of any alternative opinion.
Gatekeeping
The clearest proof of the existence of a media cartel serving the interests of the “clique” is the comparison of the reaction of “independent” media to two high-profile investigations: “The Mystery of the Loud Assassination Attempt” by the FBK and “The Treasurer” by Maxim Katz.
When the FBK releases its film, the process resembles a coordinated information operation. Dozens of the largest opposition media — Meduza, Dozhd, Mediazona, Current Time, and many others — almost instantly publish pre-prepared pieces of roughly the same content: “A new FBK investigation has been released, post being updated.” They don’t even have to watch it in advance. It’s as if they receive a command to publish and act like a loyal distribution network, ensuring maximum reach in the first minutes after release. This is standard practice when working with a friendly media pool.
But when Maxim Katz releases his own investigation criticizing the FBK, the rules of the game change instantly. The offer to provide the material in advance, under embargo, is rejected. Instead of a “green light,” the material meets a wall of feigned critical analysis. A process begins that can be described as “nitpicking to death.” The focus is deliberately shifted from the essence of the accusations — the FBK’s ties to dubious bankers — to minor details, secondary questions, and formal quibbles. They are not looking for the truth, but for a pretext to declare the entire material “low quality” and “unproven.”
The pinnacle of this cynicism is the gap between public positions and private assessments. According to testimonies, professional journalists admitted that Katz’s investigation was one of the best pieces of journalism in recent times, surpassing anything the FBK had ever done in terms of depth, evidence gathering, and fact-checking. But you will never hear this publicly. It will be called anything: a “libel,” “another attack” on the FBK, “an investigation in the replies.”
As a result, the readers of “independent” media form a strictly defined picture favorable to the “clique”: “Yes, there was probably theft from the bankers, but we don’t know the whole truth. Political cover from the FBK is unproven. And Katz only did this to attack the late Navalny and steal the foundation’s audience.” This is the ultimate goal of this media strategy: not to refute the accusations on the merits, but to blur them, drown them in doubt, and, most importantly, discredit the motives of the investigator himself. The truth becomes irrelevant. The only thing that matters is that “Katz is bad.” This works, incidentally, on any figure who has been “canceled” by the clique.
Recognition (But With a Catch)
When even this filter doesn’t work, and the quality of the work becomes impossible to deny, the final, most cynical line of defense comes into play — institutional recognition of secondary materials without the painful details. The so-called “well, we can’t admit Katz was right!”
Maxim Katz’s investigation was nominated for the “Redkollegia” award, which in itself was an acknowledgment by the audience of its quality. But this also provoked a fierce public conflict from the FBK and their supporters. In the end, the award went not to Katz but to a piece by The Bell. And here the full depth of the tragedy is revealed.
The fact is that The Bell, like many other journalists, fell victim to the very subject of the investigation — Alexander Zheleznyak. He was not a passive object. He was an active player who systematically “ingratiated himself” with journalists. Even before Katz’s investigation, The Bell published complimentary but, as it turned out, false materials about him, creating the image of an innocent victim.
The late Irina Pankratova in this story is not a villain, but a tragic figure — a professional journalist who believed the facts provided, which perfectly fit with other materials of the time and Zheleznyak’s friendships with other industry figures. However, even her piece does not contain the most important component of the investigation that actually makes it an investigation. There is nothing about political cover. And we will never be able to ask her how that happened.
In the end, the pseudo-reputation institute made a brilliant move. It could not ignore the topic, but it managed to replace the original with a safe, “sanitized” copy. Society was given the signal: yes, the bankers’ financial machinations are an important story worthy of an award. But the political connection of these bankers to the FBK is just Katz’s speculation and conspiracy theory, unworthy of attention. Thus, with the help of a prestigious award, the real investigation was marginalized, and its political core destroyed.
Appropriating Others’ Victories
When an event cannot be silenced, its history is rewritten. A prime example is the “Noon Against Putin” action during the 2024 elections. The idea was proposed by Maxim Reznik and promoted for months by independent activists and, in part, by candidate headquarters. During this time, key FBK speakers publicly opposed this strategy or treated it skeptically, promoting the meme “We won’t let ourselves be counted.”
However, when the action gained popularity and, at Reznik’s request, was supported by Alexei Navalny from prison, the FBK abruptly changed its position. They not only joined it at the very last moment but also tried to aggressively seize leadership. And after the elections, Leonid Volkov, without a hint of embarrassment, claimed that the success of the action was the FBK’s achievement. The tactic is simple: if your own strategies have failed, find someone else’s successful initiative and retroactively declare it your own. This not only hides your own ineffectiveness but also reinforces the myth that only the FBK is the sole center of decision-making and protest organization. The so-called “Another Headquarters™ Victory.”
Or take yesterday’s example. The day before yesterday, I watched Andrey Zakharov’s “Wiretap,” where he says he invites authors to discuss investigations. The investigation by SOTA about FBK donor cases was, I remind you, in February. But for some reason, according to him, he invited David Frenkel to discuss SOTA’s material. I asked the SOTA editorial team via their contact bot — they replied that no one had invited them… And really, what does Frenkel have to do with SOTA’s investigation at all?
Suppressing Dialogue
If the opponent cannot be silenced or discredited, direct suppression comes into play. Any attempt at dialogue or substantive discussion is perceived as an attack and met with aggressive pushback. This behavioral model is systemic and has manifested long before recent conflicts.
For example, the same SOTA outlet, which published the investigation into the VPN scheme and earlier about lawyer Dubograev, was branded by Michael Naki as “Putin’s helpers” and “saboteurs.” Instead of answering, there were public insults. When journalist and Port Media publisher Maria Lekukh asked uncomfortable questions about ties to Dubograev, whose firm supplies software to “the executioners of her ex-husband,” Naki responded by calling her a “prostitute” and advising her to “shut the fuck up.” Naki, incidentally, is the most ardent “witness” and reminder of the importance of the “reputation institute.”
This intolerance to criticism and unwillingness to engage in substantive dialogue is no accident — it is a signature style. It manifests in systematic blocking of critical comments on the YouTube channels and social media of the “clique’s” leaders, effectively eliminating any possibility for feedback.
Selective Historical Amnesia
Double standards and media gatekeeping are the foundation and walls on which the pseudo-reputation institute is built. The myth of “Katz the splitter” is one of many details that complement and support this structure. It is the oldest, most persistent, and most deceitful narrative that the “clique” pulls from the archive every time it needs to destroy a political competitor. The latest conflict around the “Deputies of Peaceful Russia” association became a textbook example of how this myth is fabricated and used in real time.
Eternal Kompromat for “Outsiders”
A rather telling tool in the pseudo-reputation institute’s arsenal is the manipulative use of past conflicts. A vivid example is the constant references to the conflict between Maxim Katz and Dmitry Gudkov.
This case itself is a classic political drama, not a one-sided villainy. It was a sad story of the failure of a promising project, caused by the clash of two strong ambitions and completely different approaches to political strategy. To understand the depth of the manipulation, it is enough to recall the real, not mythologized, chronology of events.
It all began with the resounding success of their tandem in the 2017 municipal elections. The “United Democrats” project was not just an action, but part of a long-term strategy: to elect enough deputies to overcome the “municipal filter” in the 2018 Moscow mayoral elections for Dmitry Gudkov. The goal was not achieved, and Gudkov ended up dependent on being nominated by the Yabloko party.
And here begins the central element of the manipulation. The story you are told is that Gudkov was caught in a hopeless trap. On one side, his campaign chief, Maxim Katz, was waging a fierce bureaucratic war with the head of the Moscow branch, Sergey Mitrokhin. Or rather, the other way around — Mitrokhin himself launched a “war against Katzism” and periodically displayed his own mayoral ambitions. In this version, Gudkov was the victim, caught between two fires, and his move to a new project with Ksenia Sobchak was a pragmatic step to save his career from an inevitable “betrayal.”
However, this “no way out” version works only if you completely ignore the real political facts. Gudkov was not in a trap but faced with a choice, and his position was strong.
First, the party was preparing to hold open primaries to determine the candidate — a mechanism that allowed bypassing Mitrokhin’s bureaucratic intrigues. Gudkov, with huge support, was the absolute favorite in these primaries, which is indirectly confirmed by the fact that Mitrokhin eventually lost them. Second, a “large combat formation” — a full-fledged mayoral campaign team — was already being formed under Gudkov.
Third, and most importantly, in the famous post where Gudkov complained about Katz, he publicly promised: “I have not changed my plans to seek nomination for mayor from Yabloko.”
Just six weeks after this promise, he reneged on his own words. He refused to fight in the primaries, abandoned the ready team, and announced the creation of a new party with Ksenia Sobchak. This was not a forced “Plan B” but a conscious refusal to fight and a breach of commitments, including the promise to support Yavlinsky in the presidential elections.
From Maxim Katz’s point of view, this was a betrayal. He abandoned the common strategy, dumped the team, and broke all agreements. This was the position of a political strategist for whom such a reversal is a mortal sin.
Thus, it was not a conflict of good versus evil or a “tragedy of irresolvable circumstances.” It was a story where one politician refused a real but difficult path of struggle and broke his commitments, and the other saw it as betrayal.
However, for the “clique,” this case turned into evergreen kompromat. They deliberately ignore key facts. They take only the quotes convenient for them out of context to present Gudkov as the victim and Katz as the sole culprit of the collapse.
The goal of this manipulation is not to understand the story but to use an old, long-healed wound as a tool for present-day harassment. This allows them, first, to avoid discussion of current, much more inconvenient topics for them (such as ties to Dubograev and Zheleznyak, or Volkov’s material gain from pushing VPNs). Second, it creates a false impression among the audience that Katz’s critical position today is not the result of his principles but of his “quarrelsome nature,” which supposedly manifested back then. Thus, the past becomes a weapon to discredit the present.
The “reputation institute” exists not to evaluate actions but to appoint the guilty and the innocent depending on their current loyalty to the “clique.” History, facts, sequence — none of this matters. Only one thing matters: who is “one of us” and who is “one of them” at the moment. And as long as this system works, any attempts at real political action will drown in hand-crafted scandals.
Total Amnesia for “Insiders”
Now, to see this mechanism in action from the other side, let’s look at those whose past is completely forgiven. A striking figure aggressively promoting the “Katz the splitter” thesis today is Maxim Reznik. And here the pseudo-reputation institute demonstrates its main property — the ability to completely ignore the past of its “respectable” members.
To understand the depth of the hypocrisy, it is enough to recall Reznik’s political career in St. Petersburg’s Yabloko in the 2010s.
- In 2012, as head of the branch, Reznik, according to numerous testimonies and media publications of the time, made a deal with the authorities for targeted election fraud in the Legislative Assembly elections to ensure the passage of Galkina and Notyag instead of Amosov and Belyaev.
- To retain control over the branch and win the fight against opponents, “dead souls” were massively enrolled in the party, among whom members of United Russia were later discovered. This was done to secure a majority at party conferences.
- His entire career in Yabloko was an unending war of annihilation with other party clans (the Amosov and Kobrin groups), which included mutual accusations, party purges, disruption of conferences, and manipulations with representation norms.
And yet, a man with such a background is perceived within the “clique” as one of the moral arbiters. He is considered “respectable.” He is given the floor at events organized by the FRF and FBK, and his ideas are implemented. His past is completely amnestied.
“Deputies of Peaceful Russia”
This contrast between “eternal kompromat” for Katz and “total amnesty” for Reznik explains what is happening right now. The latest conflict around the “Deputies of Peaceful Russia” association became a textbook example of how this dynamic is fabricated in real time.
Initially, it was an ordinary opposition project — an attempt to unite municipal deputies with an anti-war stance. When it became clear that the organization could not function effectively and was declared undesirable in Russia, the logical and responsible step, in my view, would have been to publicly dissolve it in the name of the safety of participants and their families. This would have been a classic “win-win”: Katz could not have “usurped” the brand, there would have been no platform for a “fight against Katzism” campaign, and the risks of criminal prosecution would have been significantly reduced.
But that didn’t happen. The conflict was deliberately brought into the public sphere and escalated to absurdity by Olga Galkina, a close associate of Maxim Reznik, who published a public denunciation. She demanded that Katz and other participants disclose the full list of the association, suddenly demanding transparency from what looked like a half-dead project.
The purpose of her action is not particularly obvious. It was not an attempt to achieve transparency. It was a deliberate provocation aimed at setting up people who were asking whether Galkina was being paid by the FRF, while also accusing Katz of usurpation. It was a storm in a teacup. There is an opinion that this whole sordid story was necessary for Reznik and Galkina for one simple reason — to have the appearance of representation in a political organization with a “very important” status for the Kremlin, in order to claim funding in the West.
Galkina’s own background is also telling. At the end of 2021, she demonstratively resigned her mandate as a municipal deputy in the MO “Morskoy.” The situation in the council was deadlocked: 5 mandates belonged to United Russia and 5 to the opposition team with which Galkina ran. In a pompous post she declared it impossible to work and called on all deputies, including her faction colleagues, to resign to resolve the “stalemate” through new elections.
This step was presented as a matter of principle, but rumors quickly emerged that Galkina was leaving for a paid position as an aide to Legislative Assembly vice-speaker Marina Shishkina, since combining public service and a deputy mandate is prohibited. The rumors were quickly confirmed: just a few days later, Galkina officially took the new position. Instead of honestly stating she was moving to another job, she staged a public show pressuring her colleagues, presenting her departure as a moral act.
Anything Goes for “Insiders”
There are also plenty of reverse examples, when “insiders” are forgiven for everything. Take Michael Naki, for instance. Today he is one of the most “respected” speakers in the “clique,” whose reputation is “spotless.” At the same time, the “reputation institute” somehow completely ignores the fact that Naki spent many years not just as an employee of Echo of Moscow, but hosting his own column “Michael Naki’s Playground” in Alexei Venediktov’s Diletant magazine, and also contributing to many issues of My District.
This project is at the center of one of the FBK’s loudest revenge attempts, released after Venediktov raised the topic of Zheleznyak. According to it, Venediktov’s structures received hundreds of millions of rubles from Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin’s office to publish My District magazines. This money was labeled “dirty” — payment for Venediktov’s loyalty and his promotion of key city hall projects, such as electronic voting. For this cooperation with the authorities, Venediktov was declared by the “clique” to be one of the most toxic and untouchable figures.
However, this fact has no impact on the reputation of Michael Naki, who directly worked on the project that received this funding. The dirt on Venediktov, who is condemned for every ruble received from city hall, somehow does not stick to him. No one demands explanations or repentance from Naki for years of work on a project that existed on “Sobyanin’s money.” Why? Because today he is an “insider.” His current correct stance completely nullifies any inconvenient facts from the past. For “outsiders,” as Katz’s example shows, even long-healed wounds will be picked at forever.
Monopoly on Defeat
To understand why the pseudo-reputation institute works this way — cynically, brutally, and irrationally from the standpoint of the common struggle — you need to stop seeing it as the result of personal grievances or bad character. This is not just a set of scandals. These are symptoms of a well-tuned survival model in a closed environment.
In this artificial ecosystem, cut off from real Russian politics and its voters, the struggle is not for votes in elections but for three other, much scarcer resources: attention (media reach), legitimacy (the moral right to speak on behalf of the entire opposition), and, as a result, money (donations and grants). And the pseudo-reputation institute is the main tool in this ruthless competition.
Resources and Their Distribution
In the opposition in exile, two fundamentally different types of financial models have formed.
The first model — institutional, or “grant-based.” This includes structures like the FBK, Mediazona. Their budgets largely depend on major institutional donors and Western foundations that support democracy and independent journalism. In the past, key players in this field included figures like Evgenia Albats with her foundation, and Vladimir Kara-Murza, vice president of the Free Russia Foundation. The survival of such media directly depends on their ability to prove to foundations their effectiveness, uniqueness, and legitimacy.
The second model — public, or “crowdfunding-based.” As you might guess, a vivid representative of this model is Maxim Katz. His activities are financed mainly through advertising integrations, donations from a wide audience, and personal funds. He does not depend on grants and does not compete for them.
This difference makes the conflict quite fierce. For the “grant-based” opposition, the emergence of a strong and independent player working on the “crowdfunding” model poses an existential threat. He not only draws audience attention away from them — his successful work proves that one can be effective without access to institutional money, thereby devaluing the “grant-seekers’” uniqueness in the eyes of both the audience and the foundations.
Hera, hello! Donate to Hera!
When the “clique” “destroys” Katz’s reputation, it is not just personal dislike. It is a strategy. By accusing him of “toxicity,” they send a signal not so much to the foundations as to the donor audience: “Don’t give him money, don’t shake his hand. He is a harmful element. The only right ones are us” — although in the end, the real recipients of the signal remain mostly within the same “clique.” After all, the ordinary viewer increasingly votes with their wallet. And clearly not in favor of the former.
Selectivity of Attacks
The selectivity of the pseudo-reputation institute is also striking. For example, the same Vladimir Kara-Murza, who is a close friend of Leonid Nevzlin (much closer than Mikhail Khodorkovsky), has never been attacked by the FBK for this. This fact alone proves that “ties to Nevzlin” are not a real grievance but merely a label hung on those who need to be destroyed at the moment. Kara-Murza is not attacked because he is not a direct competitor for attention and donations in the same niche as the FBK. For the record, half of the “clique” at one time or another received money from Nevzlin, and some even eagerly hung on his every word. And nothing — all is forgotten.
The Media Cartel
Control over attention is control over the second key resource, which is directly converted into donations. The information blockade of Katz’s investigation and the synchronized support of FBK’s investigations is not just editorial policy. It is the work of a kind of cartel to maintain a monopoly on attention. By recognizing Katz’s investigation as high-quality and important, “independent” media would have created an alternative center of attraction for attention.
It is much safer to replace the original with a castrated, “safe” copy from The Bell, awarding it a prize. This way, the system solves two problems at once: it closes the topic and preserves the monopoly on “proper” journalism.
Legitimacy — The Main Asset
The FBK’s main asset after Alexei Navalny’s death is his name, his legacy. This is their primary source of legitimacy. Anyone who questions their actions is automatically accused of “attacking Navalny’s legacy.” This technique is used to shut down any criticism and preserve for themselves the exclusive right to speak on behalf of the deceased leader. This is not a moral stance. This is brand protection — their main intangible asset, convertible into both attention and money.
Simulation of Struggle
Ultimately, this system produces a simulation of political activity. Its end product is not real political change in Russia, but the production of content (investigations, forums, tweets, scandals) that convinces external donors and the internal audience that the struggle is being waged — and waged in the only correct way.
The effectiveness of this struggle is measured not by its impact on the situation in Russia, but by its ability to destroy an internal competitor and maintain a monopoly on resources. In this perverse logic, victory over Katz becomes more important than victory over Putin.
In this system, the “reputation institute” is not just a broken mechanism. It is a key element of a business model that ensures the survival of organizations in exile but guarantees their strategic defeat. It creates ideal conditions for the endless reproduction of conflicts, drives out of the movement all those capable of compromise and creation, and leaves behind a scorched field dominated by apathy.
Conclusion
The “reputation institute” in the Russian opposition is a fiction.
The struggle for the “Beautiful Russia of the Future” was tragically replaced by a struggle for control over its ruins long before it was ever built. We are witnessing chronic moral bankruptcy, mistaken for political struggle. This struggle has no goal of victory. Its goal is to go on forever, destroying any competitors and preserving the monopoly on the very process of losing. In the end, the Kremlin doesn’t even have to try.
The “reputation institute” will do it all by itself.