A brief introduction
You’ve probably heard about Maxim Katz’s investigation into the bankers Zheleznyak and Leontiev, who turned out to be connected to the Anti‑Corruption Foundation (FBK). At the time of writing it has amassed over three million views.
While Katz was preparing his investigation into Zheleznyak and Leontiev, it was striking—for all of us watching from the sidelines and for me personally as an OSINT enthusiast—how journalists and other investigators ignored what was about to be published: the facts of a one‑billion‑dollar hole, a fabricated legend of “political persecution,” FBK’s facilitation of that legend, and the plainly fraudulent character of the case.
Since I was involved one way or another and personally ran into the reluctance of “respectable” outlets to dig in, I set out to compile every mention of Alexander Zheleznyak or Sergey Leontiev I could find on YouTube, in chronological order, and add the context that many might have missed due to the lack of proper coverage.
Let me note up front that stories about the bankers’ dirty dealings have been circulating in business circles for a very long time:
- Meduza — August 12, 2015
- RBC — October 16, 2015
- Vedomosti — September 20, 2015
- Pravo.ru — March 13, 2017
- Pravo.ru — July 22, 2019
- Vedomosti — February 2, 2020
- Interfax — February 15, 2021
With some surprise I also found that propagandists had mentioned Alexander Zheleznyak:
- “We see how, to avoid being extradited to Russia for his crimes, banker Alexander Zheleznyak begins sponsoring FBK,” said Vladimir Solovyov on September 15, 2021 on his YouTube channel, two weeks after the data about ACF International’s re‑registration to Zheleznyak appeared in public registries.
- Ilya Remeslo poked at things we once dug up in a day during a Twitter discussion.
But these episodes aren’t central to my narrative, because this material is essentially about the problem of the internal opposition discourse.
Or rather the lack of it…
First mentions
A reasonable starting point for the public learning about banker Alexander Zheleznyak not from “professional investigators” would be late December 2022.
December 28, 2022 — Venediktov
Alexey Venediktov had read the Financial Times article about Sergey Leontiev published two weeks earlier and advised viewers to pay attention to banker Zheleznyak’s surname.
January 20, 2023 — Venediktov
A month and a half later (after the FT piece), on January 20, 2023, Alexey Venediktov on Oleg Kashin’s stream again addressed the audience, suggesting they search for information about Alexander Zheleznyak, when Kashin asked him about the promised investigation into “security service agents” around Alexey Navalny announced back in March 2021.
January 22, 2023 — Volkov
Answering donor questions, Leonid Volkov commented on Venediktov’s statements, not forgetting to call him and Oleg Kashin “crooks”:
— As for Alexander Zheleznyak specifically, our colleague—whom we are very grateful to—came to us a year and a half earlier, when we realized that to fundraise properly around the world we needed an American legal entity.
— FSB Colonel Kirill Cherkalin <…> together with the DIA covered for banks and extorted money. <…> The outlet “Proekt” published an investigation about him and the corruption system. <…> Alexander Zheleznyak, whose name was mentioned in that piece, as a victim banker, told how Cherkalin organized the persecution.
— Generally an excellent, absolutely wonderful person <…> How is it possible that I learned about such a person in 2021, while Navalny had simply never heard of him.
Volkov lied
Later there will be a segment where Latynina describes in detail what the essence of this “covering for banks” was. In short—Cherkalin didn’t come to healthy banks.
About rallies… Before 2021, Zheleznyak didn’t organize any rallies. He appeared in January–February 2021, after Alexey Navalny’s imprisonment. And judging by his social media, he only remembered Navalny on November 9, 2020, when he put the slogan “don’t give up” in his profile header.
There is an annual rally “Boston Remembers” in Boston. Zheleznyak popped up under the announcement post in February 2021 and immediately seized the initiative, proposing a meeting at the State House.
The group Boston for Free Russia (previously “Free Navalny Boston”) was created by American Ariella Katz Miller on January 25, 2021 (yes, yes, Katz is to blame for everything again) after the January 19, 2021 rally, at which, as you may guess, Zheleznyak was not present.
I didn’t dig too deeply into the structure of Boston activism and who initiated what when. What I can say is that I didn’t find Zheleznyak in photos earlier than February 2021. Here’s a rally from January 23, 2021, organized by Ariella, where Zheleznyak still doesn’t appear.
I directly reached out to her on Twitter about how they met.
Zheleznyak appeared in the “Mir Za Navalnogo” channel—where information about rallies around the world was collected by Ulyana Yapparova—on January 28, 2021, and in the Boston for Free Russia group the day before.
It’s a funny situation: spend a couple of months doing activism in the US and you get made treasurer? 😎
Volkov claims he met Zheleznyak after Navalny’s imprisonment. Their “meeting story” will change a few times later.
And about how they ran around and couldn’t find any crowdfunding solution… That they had no one in the US and didn’t understand finance!
Volkov had a nonprofit created under him, and his team quietly fled Russia, posting photos from Georgia, spoofing geotags of Russian cities, calling those who covered this “police stooges.” In the US there was Anna Veduta, Kirill Moizik, and about a dozen active supporters. From a recent leak and from Boris Zimin’s words it became known that most money came not through crowdfunding platforms, but through deposits into a nonprofit within the Lapinskas structures.
Attempt to silence Venediktov
Overall, this back‑and‑forth might have gone unnoticed if not for FBK’s “investigation” into Venediktov’s corruption, which drew heavy criticism. In response, Venediktov published Volkov’s letter in support of Fridman, whose existence Volkov had denied—sparking “Fridmangate,” after which Volkov promised to step down.
March 10, 2023 — Venediktov
On “Zhivoi Gvozd”, Alexey Venediktov stated that Alexander Zheleznyak bought himself a political position at FBK.
August 12, 2023 — Venediktov
Venediktov mentioned Zheleznyak’s name again only on August 12, 2023. On “Zhivoi Gvozd” he speculated about the reasons Alexey Navalny hired a system insider responsible for liaising with the FSB.
When Zheleznyak first caught my eye
There’s another long story here that deserves a separate piece. I even started it, but haven’t had time to continue. It’s about preparations for the March 2024 elections. So, briefly…
In autumn 2023, Maxim Katz initiated a discussion about a common strategy for the 2024 elections. FBK categorically refused to engage in the strategy process. The story about the FRF bot farm, with talking points authored by former FBK coordinators, came to light.
And in early December 2023 among activists a version emerged as to why protests were being sabotaged before the elections:
— “Participating in the electoral cycle disqualifies you from grants. It’s one of the conditions for receiving them.”
Twitter thread | Telegram post
December 4, 2023 — Kashin
Oleg Kashin relayed these assumptions on his stream.
But the hypothesized “grant status” reason for sabotage ultimately didn’t pan out and didn’t spread.
I tried to get to the bottom of it, but I had no understanding whatsoever of how the US nonprofit tax system works. People sent me bits and pieces that didn’t fit together. I was focused on why FRF and its operative Vladimir Milov were so actively sabotaging civic protest.
And then, while searching for information about grants and laws, on December 4, 2023 someone in our chat discovered that a certain Alexander Zheleznyak was filing documents on behalf of the foundation. The previous ACF name—Rikolto—was also found.
At that time I didn’t pay much attention—just superficially gathered information (which later turned out useful)—because FBK itself didn’t interest me (I thought their sabotage was self‑explanatory). But that research ran into a dead end, I couldn’t confirm the grant hypothesis, and I shelved it.
January 16, 2024 — Letter to “Proekt”
In early January 2024, Nerses Grigoryan, head of the initiative group of defrauded creditors of Probusinessbank, reached out to the outlet “Proekt” (closely connected to FBK) asking them to help de‑politicize Sergey Leontiev’s case. He also reported that the case came to be treated as political under the direct influence of written testimony by Vladimir Ashurkov dated July 26, 2017.
Later, in summer 2024, he published screenshots of the correspondence on Twitter.
January 29, 2024 — “Port” outlet
The outlet “Port” reported that Leonid Volkov remained a key leader of international FBK despite his public statements about stepping down.
Twitter thread | Telegram post
Alexander Zheleznyak’s presence in the incorporation documents was still unnoticed by the wider public.
The series “Traitors”
On April 16, 2024, Maria Pevchikh triumphantly released episode one of the series “Traitors,” and on April 23 episode two—teasing in social media that the episode would be about Khodorkovsky. The public read this as a direct attack on MBK.
Moreover, FBK kicked up a massive brawl, leveling a lot of accusations at respected figures of the 1990s, members of Khodorkovsky‑affiliated structures, and his friends.
Many activists were outraged that “FBK tanked the protest and then made propaganda about the wild 90s.”
Twitter — “Who benefits?”
Rumors began that someone with a large wallet had ordered it. Many started asking “cui bono?” On Twitter, Denis Popov asked the question and I sent him links to the materials I had found, and started looking for new ones.
May 4, 2024 — “Sota” outlet
The information reached Maxim Katz, and when on May 4, 2024 “Sota” published a story that FBK staff were sharing personalized donation links, and Maria Pevchikh in response accused “Sota” of murky financing, Katz publicly asked Pevchikh: “Who is Alexander Zheleznyak?”, again clearly hinting at murky FBK financing.
He also put the same question to investigative journalist Alexey Kovalev, but he never investigated it.
Later, that Kovalev would actively join the harassment of Gera, Katz, and even me.
In this same discussion, the Financial Times piece re‑emerged and drew broad interest.
Question to Pevchikh | Question to Kovalev
May 5, 2024 — Svetov
Katz’s question was evidently noticed by Mikhail Svetov, who the next day—May 5, 2024—voiced his view on stream regarding the presence of Alexander Zheleznyak, “a man of a staggering biography,” among ACF’s co‑founders.
— Awarded personally by Vladimir Putin with the Medal of the Order “For Merit to the Fatherland” II class in 2014. <…> People whose co‑founder has such a biography are not the kind who can afford to climb onto the little stool of “moral superiority.”
May 8, 2024 — Venediktov
Alexey Venediktov on “Zhivoi Gvozd” again addressed FBK: “you need to find the mole yourselves,” drawing attention to the figure of Alexander Zheleznyak, “about whom I’ve been talking for a long time.”
May 9, 2024 — Venediktov
On “I Gryanul Graham,” Alexey Venediktov said publicly:
— Alexander Zheleznyak was co‑chair of the Association of Russian Banks’ committee on relations with law‑enforcement agencies and liaised with the FSB on behalf of all Russian banks.
May 11, 2024 — Latynina
Yulia Latynina reviewed the FT piece on Sergey Leontiev, shared what she had learned about Alexander Zheleznyak, and compared how business failure consequences differ in the US and Russia—concluding that taking money from bankers is “kosher.”
— Who is Zheleznyak? Let me remind you: this is already the discussion about Maria Pevchikh’s film that had died down. And to needle FBK, they pulled out the banker Zheleznyak’s name.
— The judge said that Zheleznyak—Zheleznyak’s business—was taken away because Zheleznyak helped Navalny. This was political persecution.
— Zheleznyak’s bank had a huge hole—in plain language, he robbed clients of a billion dollars, hung this, or I don’t remember the exact figure <…> hung it on a Cypriot offshore, the offshore on another offshore…
— FBK castigates oligarchs, “cancels” oligarchs, but takes money from people like this.
— I can’t say I investigated the Probusinessbank story very diligently <…> In my view, Mr. Zheleznyak and Mr. Leontiev are absolutely kosher people. You can take money from them. And they didn’t do anything such that one should feel ashamed.
— Then Mr. Leontiev himself came—this legendary meeting, by the way, is told in the same FT piece… Leontiev put his feet on the table and explained to Nabiullina who she is and that the presidential administration will call her now.
For what it’s worth, Yulia Latynina delved the deepest and offered the most explanations, correcting herself as new information arrived.
Sometime in spring 2024 — Zayakin
In October 2024, Roman Dobrokhotov commented under his piece that FBK had received materials from Andrey Zayakin about laundering the prosecutors’ slush fund by Probusinessbank bankers back in the spring (when Katz started raising the topic).
July 15, 2024 — Badanin
Two days after Katz’s “Roman, hi! Are you funded by Alexander Zheleznyak or Sergey Leontiev?”, on July 15, 2024, Roman Badanin unleashed a Twitter thread with the following accusations:
— In 2023 Zheleznyak in the US started a lawsuit against Vladimir Gusinsky… After VG lost in court, Venediktov launched a new attack on Zheleznyak. Katz joined in—Katz, a new acquaintance of the “persecuted by Putin” Gusinsky.
— Echo employees directly received extra pay from VG. <…> Venediktov was on the boss’s payroll at least until 2019.
— Grigoryan long cooperated with Zheleznyak… Received literally a salary from Zheleznyak for his activism. Years later Zheleznyak stopped paying him a salary; he went to the banker’s enemies. In particular, he dealt with Boris Titov and Evgeny Fedorov of NOD. <…>
— The media often get approached by crooks and crazies… now many crooks came at once—and at the moment when the FSB decided to take down Zheleznyak and FBK.
— Katz is a nonentity on whom I promise not to waste another second of my working time. Read “Proekt”! <…> About half a year ago some Ners Grigoryan started going around media with a “terrible insider” about Zheleznyak… he wrote to Katz, he also wrote to “Proekt”.
It’s worth clarifying that Nerses Grigoryan sent documents to the SVTV newsroom in the summer, and later in July to Katz—not “about half a year earlier,” as Badanin claimed.
Regarding Badanin’s claims, I spoke with Nerses Grigoryan; the result was an hour‑long interview—have a look:
July 16, 2024 — Aleksashenko
Sergei Aleksashenko tried to inject some sanity, though he wasn’t really heard. On July 16, 2024, he commented on the “disputes about the personalities of bankers Sergey Leontiev and Alexander Zheleznyak”:
— <…> there’s a large number of cases saying that this money from the bank was, to put it mildly, stolen—withdrawn in favor of the bank’s shareholders and managers <…> The figure is more than ambiguous <…> I haven’t seen a single serious counterargument from Leontiev or Zheleznyak defending their position that “we didn’t steal.” An ugly story.
— Vladimir Gusinsky left Russia long ago and currently has no real business interests in Russia or in the Russian information space. I do not see how he could be an “interested party.”
July 17, 2024 — Aleksashenko
The next day Aleksashenko corrected himself (he had mixed up Luxembourg and Liechtenstein) and spoke about the circumstances of bank failures of that period, and how various bankers obtained political asylum after emptying their banks:
— Bankers—their owners—thought they could do anything…
— In the Probusinessbank story there’s nothing special on one hand: not the first, not the last. On the other hand, the scale of the hole in Probusinessbank: more than 80 billion rubles at the exchange rate back then. That’s 2015—some $2.5–3 billion.
— I know one of the main shareholders (probably the main one) of Probusinessbank, Sergey Leontiev, has a Liechtenstein court decision recognizing his prosecution as political—but that protects him from claims by Russian authorities. As I understand, now claims are brought by depositors and clients who lost money in the bank.
July 17, 2024 — Kashin
Oleg Kashin voiced his confidence that neither Katz nor Venediktov had ironclad proof that Zheleznyak is a thief—just as there’s no proof that FBK works for Russian security services. Still, he noted that the process of “raising the stakes” might make insiders “jump ship” while there’s time.
— Although the story, of course, even at this level of evidence, should have killed FBK’s reputation.
July 17, 2024 — Venediktov
Venediktov wished Badanin a speedy recovery and complained about Katz “looking the wrong way.”
— Seems to me that’s the main point. That for money a person received political protection from FBK in the US, in Luxembourg, and so on. For money. Because he’s a sponsor. And no one is hiding this. Volkov doesn’t hide it in the FT interview. It’s not something I invented.
July 17, 2024 — Volkov
Answering donor questions, Leonid Volkov poured accusations and value judgments on Maxim Katz, “Sota,” and a former staffer, Alexander Zykov, who had spoken harshly about Zheleznyak:
— First there were defrauded depositors, then it turned out there were no defrauded depositors either.
— No, Alexander Zheleznyak is not one of the leaders of our organization, FBK.
— No, Alexander Zheleznyak did not steal any money from Probusinessbank’s depositors. That’s not true. There’s not a single ruling, not a single court decision to that effect.
— <…> This technical function was indeed taken on by Alexander Zheleznyak and he continues to perform it to this day. We are extremely grateful to him. He does it completely free for us. It’s not a small amount of work. It isn’t tied to any powers, any position, any organizational function.
— He’s our most valuable volunteer, a great person who for nearly four years now has been pulling the absolutely volunteer yoke of maintaining the technical American entity.
— Today, in the 21st century, a critical thing is working with information. Being able to tell fakes from non‑fakes. Being able to understand not only what’s said, but who says it and how. Working with primary sources and documents, treating data critically. Checking everything with your own mind. That’s what we stand on, and that’s how it will be.
Volkov also defamed Alexander Zykov by accusing him of embezzlement.
It’s a long video—brace yourselves.
The only investigations
July 19, 2024 — “Sota” outlet
“Sota” published their own investigation based solely on documents from Nerses Grigoryan they had obtained by unknown means: “He is not your volunteer: the story of banker Zheleznyak.” They asserted that Probusinessbank was preparing for bankruptcy and that it was planned by the bankers; that the Brooklyn mansion where the foundation was registered by Zheleznyak was purchased for $4 million.
— The DIA placed a 500 million ruble deposit in Probusinessbank at 20% per annum <…> just in time for the license revocation the DIA got its money back. <…> Fitch assigned the bank a “junk” rating, but “the deposit placement looks suspicious and indicates corrupt interaction.”
— Zheleznyak evaded paying 640 million rubles in taxes <…> the case did not reach a logical conclusion. <…> He received the Medal of the Order “For Merit to the Fatherland” II class in 2014.
— Leontiev states in a New York court that the case is politically motivated.
— The Brooklyn mansion was acquired for $4 million. It is there that International FBK is now registered.
However, afterwards, none of the YouTube journalists or major outlets commented on this investigation, nor were there substantive comments from FBK.
July 19, 2024 — “Port” outlet
At the same time, “Port” published a piece dissecting Badanin’s claims from his thread four days earlier against Maxim Katz and Nerses Grigoryan. It turned out that Gusinsky’s son Ilya helped Alexander Zheleznyak obtain a work visa and personally transferred over $300,000 from a family trust for his father’s media company.
— Could Vladimir Gusinsky have told politician Maxim Katz a story about Alexander Zheleznyak that differs from the one told by Leonid Volkov—and even introduced him to Grigoryan? Of course. Especially since the Probusinessbank story itself merits a clear, professional text.
By the time Katz published his investigation, apart from “Port” and “Sota,” no media had shown interest in the topic or reached out to Nerses Grigoryan, Maxim Katz, or the Twitter activists who had been running their own mini‑investigations in parallel.
Twitter vs “media” standoff
July 19, 2024 — Svetov and Kashin
A sharp public spat between Roman Badanin and Maxim Katz became a pretext for discussing the protracted conflict between FBK, “Sota,” and Katz on Mikhail Svetov’s stream with Oleg Kashin.
— Roman Badanin <…> now he’s some kind of thug talking at Dmitry Medvedev’s second‑bottle level.
— FBK’s main problem today is a complete misunderstanding of how they are perceived <…> how much goodwill FBK has burned through in recent years.
— Volkov <…> accused <…> of embezzling funds; and not only failed to provide documents—he didn’t even bother to answer where that accusation came from.
— And it may well be that it’s the FBK people who will make the fatal move—who, aside from other dubious qualities, are absolutely devoid of communicative capacity and don’t understand how they look. Which is, of course, good.
July 20, 2024 — Treshchanin and Smirnov
My anti‑heroes Sergey Smirnov and Dmitry Treshchanin were indignant that viewers demanded coverage of the ongoing public debate about “Zheleznyak” (which Smirnov called “a Twitter brawl”):
— <…> media do not orient themselves to what is discussed on Twitter.
— There are certain information bubbles <…> the Zheleznyak topic is now very important in a very particular and very closed bubble <…> outside this bubble this story essentially does not exist.
Treshchanin spent a long time talking about the “DIA scheme,” asserting that defrauded depositors were “pulled out from somewhere,” that the DIA robbed them, and that the bankers couldn’t settle debts because the bank was seized.
Which is, frankly, nonsense.
After long musings about financing principles they criticized Katz and aligned with Badanin’s position—branding “Proekt” the editor of “the most reputationally powerful media.” Smirnov added that such investigations aren’t their “profile.”
What exactly is your profile then?
After Katz’s investigation was released, “Mediazona” managed to independently confirm one transaction described in the piece.
Every time I head to these gentlemen’s streams, I mentally prepare for a burning posterior. They never disappoint… I’ve basically summarized what it’ll be about—brace yourselves…
July 20, 2024 — Latynina
Yulia Latynina re‑evaluated the situation with new data:
— I can say for sure that this is not true—it’s laughable nonsense—because I talked to a lot of people who tried to buy Bank24.ru from Zheleznyak, I think, when he started having problems, and there was not a word about Navalny. There was an entirely objective reason: a hole in the bank that, according to the Central Bank, later reached a billion dollars.
— People didn’t want a hole, but once it appeared, they decided running away with money is better than without.
— People lost a billion dollars. How can a billion dollars “accidentally” disappear? That’s siphoning.
— Cherkalin only came to banks that stank. No, he didn’t come to big, robust, good banks, and we should not turn Elvira Nabiullina into an FSB handmaiden.
— And in general people remembered them as extraordinarily self‑confident—telling everyone “we’re not like the others, we know everything; you don’t understand anything.”
— What Volkov wrote has nothing to do with reality, because—first—Cherkalin came only to banks, as I said, that stank.
— All participants in this story about Zheleznyak being persecuted for Navalny hadn’t heard of it before this Zheleznyak began telling courts and showing the affidavit everywhere.
Gatekeeping
July 21, 2024 — Zakharov and Shepelin
On the evening stream Andrey Zakharov and Ilya Shepelin again expressed their unwillingness to dig in, resorting to irony:
— Are they crucifying us on Twitter for something—because we’re having fun? Are these people mourning the not‑to‑be next Biden term or what?
— No, these are the “fighters with Zheleznyak.”
— Oh, great, great. Half the people are in my ignore list, so I don’t know what they write.
— I see people continue this Zheleznyak brawl <…> their sacred and endless war, it seems.
July 24, 2024 — Venediktov
The next viewer question to Venediktov on “Zhivoi Gvozd” is one that disturbed me then and still does now:
Why have all independent media swallowed their tongues about FBK’s disgrace in defending Zheleznyak? This topic has gone beyond Twitter.
Venediktov suggested addressing journalists.
Which we did—earning bans and accusations of sectarianism ¯_(ツ)_/¯
— <…> I had a good interview on “I Gryanul Graham” <…> I was prepared, including on FBK and Zheleznyak. He didn’t ask the question. Well then, he’s not interested.
— We’ll have Maxim Katz in six minutes—Aydar is hosting. Throw Aydar your questions so he asks them.
He also disagreed with Katz’s approach:
— I disagree with Maxim <…> he’s looking in the wrong place. <…> Is it right or wrong to give political cover to sponsors for money—even if the money is clean?
July 24, 2024 — Katz
On the same day, answering questions on “Zhivoi Gvozd,” Maxim Katz clarified what the “Twitter brawl about Zheleznyak” is really about:
— Some time ago it turned out that among the founders, in the leadership of FBK’s US legal entity <…> is Alexander Zheleznyak. Someone not particularly known in the opposition space, non‑public. His past prompted questions—he turned out to be a former head of Probusinessbank that went bust.
— People started asking questions. Venediktov started first, I think, and others followed. <…> There were no clear answers. They said he’s a volunteer, just a big friend who set up the legal entity, and that’s it.
— Three weeks ago they came out accusing that everyone who asks about Zheleznyak works for the SVR <…> Based on an “The Insider” investigation—lots of stuff about the SVR’s campaigns, and supposedly one targeted FBK’s Boston co‑founder.
— Naturally that stung me; I don’t work for the SVR—that’s a serious accusation <…> So I decided to dig: who is this Zheleznyak? <…> And, well, a bottomless pit opened… <…> I also, with the help of my Twitter readers, assembled a team of domain experts. We’re preparing a detailed breakdown of who this “Zheleznyak” is…
July 24, 2024 — Chez
The same day I tweeted that in December 2021, Alexander Lomov—who, per the criminal case materials, sent to the Central Bank falsified reports masking the growing hole in the bank since 2011—was appointed ACF’s president, vice‑president, and treasurer.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2022, Alexey Navalny stated that an “international FBK organization” would be established. At that moment Probusinessbank staff had held key posts in the existing foundation for over half a year.
I also noted that three days after Navalny’s statement on Facebook that ACF International had been registered, Alexander Lomov disappeared from the list and Alexander Zheleznyak became vice‑president.
July 26, 2024 — Plyushchev
On his stream, Alexander Plyushchev explained why he and other journalists engage in gatekeeping—contrasting themselves with “some outlets often linked to Leonid Nevzlin”—retelling his view of the recent Twitter events:
— For me, all sides are acting extremely stupid, excuse me. I’m not the smartest knight in a white cloak—but everything out there is extremely dubious.
— This is literally a Darwin Award contest on Twitter. I’ve quietly unfollowed half of them—already impossible to watch.
I don’t quite see how this aligns with journalism. The job of journalists is to ask questions—not IGNORE them.
July 27, 2024 — Venediktov
Answering “Why would it benefit Zheleznyak to cooperate with FBK and donate?” and “Why does he compromise FBK?” Venediktov shared a phone conversation with Gusinsky:
— I think FBK’s leadership compromises itself.
— Why Zheleznyak needs FBK is clear to me. Because FBK leadership <…> provided political cover to Zheleznyak <…> This is a group of people profiting off the influence Alexey Navalny earned. They trade on his name.
— I called Gusinsky <…> I didn’t know they were acquainted. The first thing I heard from Gusinsky: Zheleznyak is a great guy. Yes, we have issues now, but he’s a great guy. And you know <…> he worked for me. He received a salary from me when he moved to America. <…> And thanks to us—Gusinsky’s company—Zheleznyak got a green card, as our employee. He’s a great guy.
July 27, 2024 — Treshchanin and Smirnov
Dmitry Treshchanin shared his Twitter debate experience—someone he talked to “converted” to the investigation. Sergey Smirnov criticized attempts to reach journalists in Twitter:
— I see no sense in arguments… You convince nobody. You waste emotions, quarrel <…> these speculations are extremely tiring from not‑the‑most… I’ll soften it… knowledgeable people who start telling you how to do investigations. Investigations… You can’t conduct an investigation in replies.
He likely refers to debates he ran from July 21 on Twitter on Zheleznyak—including with Katz—asserting Katz wouldn’t prove anything; that it’s obviously a big case; that Katz has no standing to criticize journalism. He said months are needed to study documents and talk to all depositors; that Katz runs a commissioned campaign unrelated to journalism.
July 28, 2024 — Bryukhanova
On “Obyektiv,” Anastasia Bryukhanova shared her thoughts about “Zheleznyakgate”:
— There’s a problem of stolen bank money and a problem that those who did this don’t want to return it and hide behind “it’s all politics.”
— One key opposition organization is entangled in a corruption story of covering up theft. This changes the political landscape because it discredits the opposition in the public’s eyes.
— A single representative organ or consolidated structure cannot be assembled now… Until we inside the opposition sort out how one of the key actors got wrapped into this.
— Whether FBK gets finished off lies entirely in FBK’s own hands—the people still there can fix this.
July 28, 2024 — Svetov
Mikhail Svetov voiced concerns ahead of Katz’s investigation:
— Since I saw documents Katz is working with, I’m curious what he releases. Because by those documents you can’t confirm the accusations he’s been hurling for almost four weeks. He must have additional documents. <…> If not, the video will be unconvincing. <…> If there are extras, it may be very interesting.
— The question “who is Zheleznyak?” is perfectly fair. A man showing up in many documents but entirely non‑public <…> The question is absolutely legitimate.
— Maxim behaved so confidently these last weeks that it seems he has something extra I haven’t seen. <…> In my view, FBK’s activity the last few years has been exclusively destructive for the public, anti‑war movement and the opposition overall.
July 28, 2024 — Zakharov and Shepelin
On stream, Ilya Shepelin and Andrey Zakharov continued to express displeasure about the public discussion:
— There’s been a Twitter brawl for weeks around the ex‑Probusinessbank owner Zheleznyak now sitting in FBK’s US governing structures <…> Vladimir Ashurkov testified in court saying, yes, their case is political. <…> FBK’s name is being used to give this person’s prosecution a political character; maybe that’s wrong.
— When a political row happens inside a political process, it matters. When there is no political process, it spills into meaningless argument that repels neutral people.
— We aren’t the new faces of the opposition. We are old faces of journalism who turned into bloggers.
July 31, 2024 — Svetov
On “Zhivoi Gvozd,” Mikhail Svetov suggested Ilya Yashin’s involvement could change the dynamics:
— The whole conversation about Zheleznyak could change dramatically if Ilya Yashin suddenly gets involved.
To “isn’t this scandal inopportune?” he replied:
— What do you mean “we’ll sort it out later”? <…> Questions like “who is Zheleznyak,” “what is he doing inside FBK governance,” “why is he the treasurer”—these are perfectly fair. An organization that claims transparency must answer and be open on such topics.
— If Zheleznyak is indeed buying himself out of sanctions and trying to present himself abroad as a political refugee—that’s one story. If he never robbed anyone and later went to help FBK—that’s another story.
Hopes for Yashin—as we now see—did not pan out.
July 31, 2024 — Kasyanov
Mikhail Kasyanov dismissed the situation as “superficial squabbles”:
— I get it—these are personal dislikes of one group of our young activists toward another. I treat this somewhat from the sidelines.
— But overall I said we’re united. <…> Everyone treats the war and the Putin regime the same. On the key issue we’re united. There are some spats <…> unpleasant, yes. <…> I take it easy, so to speak. I think these disputes will subside sooner or later.
“Nevzlingate”; Katz postpones publication
Katz’s investigation was ready in mid‑August; then they worked on the website.
And then, on September 12, 2024, FBK published an investigation against Nevzlin—dragging Khodorkovsky in more than blaming Nevzlin—calling on his staff to go free‑agent.
Katz postponed his publication.
September 15, 2024 — “Herald of the Storm”
On “Vestnik Buri,” discussing FBK’s Nevzlin piece, the hosts recalled Zheleznyak:
— FBK also has issues—say, the Volkov story and lobbying for Russian oligarchs’ interests.
— Remember the ties to banker Alexander Zheleznyak? <…> He illegally gets depositors’ money, per some reports <…> and essentially those same depositors’ money finances FBK’s US legal entity—stolen money. We never heard a comment. And won’t, probably.
They actually did an okay job covering events—surprisingly. I didn’t include other videos because they mostly recapped events without additional analysis.
September 20, 2024 — Svetov and Kashin
Discussing recent events, Svetov and Kashin again touched on Zheleznyak and FBK’s Nevzlin investigation:
— I don’t think private donations are FBK’s budget base; there’s bigger money.
— FBK is a real party of crooks and thieves—by the Zheleznyak phase, I think everyone’s convinced.
Svetov’s skepticism again surfaced:
— It feels like there isn’t enough proof to release a convincing video.
— Maxim says he’ll release in September. Now he says it won’t be out before New Year.
On “The Insider’s” behavior:
— “The Insider” quietly deleted screenshots of Nevzlin’s correspondence where Latvian authorities’ “readiness” to open a case against Ashurkov was discussed.
This, by the way, echoes a Twitter finding where “The Insider,” FBK, and then Lev Kadik of Delfi conflated Ashurkov’s London questioning in the PNB Bank case with Matus’ promises to open a case in Latvia in the BIB Bank matter. Media coverage of this substitution and later actions by “The Insider” never materialized.
September 20, 2024 — Katz
On Twitter, Maxim Katz addressed Yulia Navalnaya offering to let her review the investigation before publication.
Yulia Navalnaya did not respond.
September 24, 2024 — Katz
Answering whether he would postpone his publication because of FBK’s Nevzlin piece, Katz explained his plans and why he made the investigation:
— I’ll release it—but I put it on hold. It’s been ready for a few days. <…> I held it back due to these events—I don’t want the focus to shift from Nevzlin to FBK.
— The leadership of FBK includes a former Russian banker who stole a lot of money from Probusinessbank—at least $400 million, probably close to a billion. <…> He and his partner Sergey Leontiev actively leverage this political status <…> to present their case in European courts as political.
Katz was outraged the topic wasn’t being discussed properly:
— The fact that an important sponsor and one of the leaders is such a person is under‑discussed. This may influence their political agenda and positions. <…> FBK supports the bankers—says it’s political and the money should be left with them. They could come out and support the depositors, say the case is not political. Then what questions would there be?
— Why should I keep quiet about the schemes of people who now present themselves as political refugees—when they’re thieves? I don’t get it.
To “isn’t it demotivating?” he offered a vision of how to make the opposition more attractive:
— Maybe some things look like one big lump, but within that lump there are things that must be talked about.
— If the Russian opposition were structured as a political force—these discussions would be held inside.
— It started when we asked questions and were told we work for intelligence. I can’t just leave that be.
September 25, 2024 — Volkov
Volkov denied any pre‑coordination with Delfi:
— No, we did not talk in advance. It’s good‑faith work by Delfi’s Russian‑language desk.
He hinted at Katz’s ties to Nevzlin:
— This plot about a house that Ashurkov allegedly bought—actually untrue, he didn’t—mysteriously shows up in Katz’s Twitter in the summer.
He mocked the investigation:
— Katz has been running around for five months saying he can prove bankers Zheleznyak and Leontiev <…> supposedly stole money from their bank. <…> We know his materials don’t add up. <…> If there’s anything to answer, we’ll answer. And we’ll smash it on the facts—easily.
Volkov lied again
At that point less than three months had passed since Katz’s appeal to FBK to sort out the Zheleznyak situation.
The “plot about the house” Volkov referenced was published on September 26, 2021 by the Latvian state channel LSM.
A brief excerpt:
— The bank also sold its subsidiary “Calleri Limited,” which owned a luxury mansion in suburban London, without requiring immediate payment. The appraised value of the house is about 10 million euros. The buyer is listed as Vladimir Ashurkov, living in London, apparently the executive director of FBK founded by Kremlin critic Alexey Navalny.
“The asset was effectively released on terms of payment by promise, without receiving any security,” the administrator Krastiņš said.
Krastiņš is an official—he led PNB Bank’s asset administration to recover creditors’ funds.
September 25, 2024 — Svetov and Latynina
Mikhail Svetov and Yulia Latynina discussed the mismatch between FBK’s public position and actions, internal contradictions, and corporate responsibility:
— “Fitch” revoked the bank’s rating six months earlier because there was a billion‑dollar hole; money siphoned to Cyprus via very strange manipulations.
— Volkov unleashed a series of posts in which—excuse me—there’s not a single true word.
— The Volkov post was not written by Maria Pevchikh. This is the classic case where two people inside a structure have completely different beliefs and interests.
— When FBK says “Nevzlin and Khodorkovsky are the same,” I say “the Free Russia Foundation and FBK are the same.”
September 25, 2024 — Felgengauer
Tatyana Felgengauer said she was waiting for Katz’s video:
— I don’t know whom to believe—so let’s wait and see what Katz’s investigation is.
— Let’s see how convincing it is and how FBK responds.
September 28, 2024 — Treshchanin and Smirnov
On stream, Dmitry Treshchanin argued Katz’s video is made “for believers.” Sergey Smirnov suggested waiting:
— There will hardly be a political component.
— I debated Maxim on Twitter. I fear this is a newbie’s “first investigation.” He thinks he dug up something—but it will turn out <…> somewhere something was shady.
Katz’s investigation published
On October 1, 2024, Maxim Katz released the investigation after many attempts to publicly prod FBK to sort it out and correct the mistake.
FBK staff reacted as expected.
Outlets that had refused to investigate or cover the situation—but were seen publishing FBK’s Nevzlin piece within minutes—published news about Katz’s video belatedly and with skepticism.
Shortly before publication Katz had offered major opposition outlets an embargoed review—all declined.
Outlets that had previously refused to investigate or cover the situation but promptly amplified FBK’s Nevzlin piece published notes about Katz’s video belatedly and skeptically.
Shortly before publication, Katz offered several major opposition outlets an embargoed review. All declined.
Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn?
It became obvious to me that many “journalists” turned into bloggers—and there are hardly any replacements for them. Investigative work at FBK and the outlets loyal to them devolved into propaganda, while the broader public demand is dismissed with the logic: “If I ignore it, maybe it will go away.” Any dislikes under videos where they spoon‑feed you nonsense are framed as a coordinated raid. Widespread degradation and gatekeeping…
I hope you draw your own conclusions.
Preparing this material took me over two months. You can support me via Boosty from the profile. There you can also find links to social media.
I plan to separately detail how Leontiev politicized the case and why FBK’s response is “Katz’s trap.”
UPD 11.04.2025: Adjusted the introductory block: 1) added links to business media materials; 2) clarified the date of Solovyov’s YouTube remarks; 3) rephrased to reduce possible misunderstandings.